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Fundamental changes are underway in the U.S. agri-food system, changes that are altering
traditional marketing relationships.  Parts of the food system are becoming tightly integrated, such
as the poultry subsector and, increasingly, the pork subsector.  The tightening of vertical linkages
has been characterized by movement from open markets to various forms of managed coordination,
e.g. contracting, strategic alliances, and single ownership of multiple market stages.
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STRATEGIC CHOICE ALONG THE VERTICAL COORDINATION CONTINUUM 
Fundamental changes are underway in the U.S. agri-food system, changes that are altering
traditional marketing relationships.  Parts of the food system are becoming tightly integrated, such as
the poultry subsector and, increasingly, the pork subsector.  The tightening of vertical linkages has
been characterized by movement from open markets to various forms of managed coordination, e.g.,
contracting, strategic alliances, and single ownership of multiple market stages.   To date, research
about these changing modes of coordination appears to be largely focused on either (1) developing a
better understanding of the characteristics and motivations of an individual mode of coordination
(Sporleder; Frank), or (2) understanding the broad differences between external (market) and internal
(contract/ownership) approaches to vertical coordination (Barry; Martin; Barkema; Boehlje and
Schrader).  Both of these efforts have been necessary and valuable, but the research in this arena
needs to take an additional direction: Given the increasing variety of vertical coordination
strategies available to agri-food firms, how does a particular firm decide which strategy to use?
Empirically, it can be observed that many variations of vertical coordination strategy have
evolved, both in agri-food markets and in other industrial markets, including joint ventures, keiretsus,
virtual corporations, licensing agreements, production specification contracts, etc.  On the one hand,
if each of these strategies is distinct and no taxonomy exists to show how these various strategies are
interrelated, then firm-level decision making becomes an immensely complex task of assessing, option
by option, which strategy may be feasible and appropriate for a particular firm in a particular market
situation.  On the other hand, if the strategies are interrelated and form a true continuum of options,
then understanding the continuum and its characteristics helps simplify the decision process.  A given2 1998 AAEA Symposium
firm can assess its current and/or desired place on the continuum and then select an appropriately
limited number of coordination strategies for further analysis and choice. 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that a continuum does exist that may provide a limited
number of factors a firm should consider in its choice of vertical coordination strategy.  The paper
proceeds as follows: definition of the continuum, development of criteria for strategy selection, and
presentation of conclusions and unresolved issues.
Defining the Continuum
Vertical coordination can be defined as “the alignment of direction and control across
segments of a production/marketing system (King).”  The factors that are aligned and controlled are
price, quantity, quality, and terms of exchange (Sporleder).  From a theoretical perspective, the
options for achieving vertical coordination have been conceptualized as a continuum running from
open markets to complete vertical integration (multiple market stages under single ownership). 
Williamson has established this sense of continuum generally, while Sporleder; Barkema; Henderson;
Matin et al.; Galizzi and Venturini; and others have presented this idea in relation to agri-food
markets.
Although this idea of a continuum is intuitively appealing, most of the prior theoretical work
has focused on the two ends of the continuum, i.e., spot markets and vertical integration, while the
middle of the continuum has been largely unexplored in detail, except to posit that various forms of
contracting and/or alliances lie along the middle points.  In order to help firms make decisions about
coordination strategy, much more needs to be known about the middle and how it truly is a
continuum.3 1998 AAEA Symposium
To be fair to the literature, a variety of hybrid coordination strategies have been identified,
ranging from formal mechanisms, such as, contracts and equity arrangements (Joskow; Osborn and
Baughn), to more informal strategies, such as, information sharing and joint planning (Noordewier,
John, and Nevin; Palay).  The middle has also been defined as networks (Thorelli) or hybrid
governance structure (Williamson, 1975; Powell; Borys and Jemison).  There has even been
considerable research regarding individual strategies within the continuum.  For example, Spekman et
al. conducted an in-depth analysis of a number of international strategic alliances in order to better
understand the processes of alliance formation and management.  While this type of research is useful,
this paper calls for research that seeks to understand the uniqueness and inter-connectedness between
individual  strategies and the continuum of vertical coordination strategies.
Figure 1 presents the continuum hypothesized for this discussion.  Five major categories of
vertical coordination strategy are suggested running, as in past works, from spot markets to vertical
integration.  At the ends of the continuum, the characteristics of “invisible-hand” coordination and
“managed” coordination are respectively listed.  True to Adam Smith, invisible-hand coordination
allows individual economic actors to follow their self-interest and pursue exchange relationships that
are short-term, opportunistic, limited as to information sharing, flexible, and preserving of the actors’
independence.  At the other extreme, managed coordination is built upon the mutual interests of the
exchange actors who pursue relationships that are long-term, benefit sharing, open as to information
flow, stable, and supportive of interdependence.  The continuum of Figure 1 suggests that, as
strategies are considered from left to right, coordination moves from being dominated by invisible-
hand characteristics through a changing mix of invisible-hand/managed characteristics to being


















Strategic Options for Vertical Coordination
Figure 1: THE VERTICAL COORDINATION CONTINUUM
NOTE: The diagonal line represents the mix of invisible-hand and managed coordination characteristics
found in each of the five alternative strategies for vertical coordination.  The area above the diagonal
indicates the relative level of invisible-hand characteristics and the area below the diagonal indicates the
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The most obvious first question in defining the continuum concerns why a continuum of
coordination strategies is needed at all?  Williamson (1973) has clearly shown why.  In a world of
bounded rationality and opportunism, the neoclassical result that coordination automatically arises
from the operation of a market system does not hold.  Coordination errors can exist either because
(1) they are intentionally created through the opportunism and hold-up activities of those with market
power, or (2) they are unintentionally created by the bounded rationality of economic actors who
produce too much or too little given the uncertainties of the marketplace.  Williamson argues that
hierarchy (managed coordination) can be substituted for markets (invisible-hand coordination) and
economic efficiency will thereby be increased.  In other words, the form of governance structure does
matter.
But why so many potential alternatives for managing coordination?  Showing that the two end
strategies as well as the middle strategies form a natural continuum requires a primary focus on how
the various strategies achieve coordination across the continuum.  The argument advanced here is
that the latent variable that creates the continuum is the intensity of control that the alternative
strategies employ to assure that proper coordination occurs, i.e., coordination with minimum potential
for error.  Strategies toward the left side of the continuum have low intensities of control while the
strategies toward the right side have high intensities of control.  Moreover, the very nature of control
fundamentally shifts as one moves from left to right on the continuum.
With spot markets, the intensity of coordination control is low.  The invisible hand of the
market determines price and broadly acceptable performance standards.  The only control that parties
on each side of a transaction can exercise is to engage in price discovery and make either a yes or no
decision to enter into the transaction.  In this sense, the opportunity to exercise control occurs almost
entirely ex ante to the transaction.  The only ex post control decision is whether or not to repeat the6 1998 AAEA Symposium
transaction with the same party if such repetition is needed in the future.  In cases of less than pure
competition, e.g., monopoly, one actor can have a major influence over the establishment of the
coordinating conditions.  To the actor with this market power, it would seem that she has
coordination control to specify some of the terms of exchange.  However, in spot markets, the
weaker actor retains the right to walk away from the exchange, and the availability of substitute
products puts another type of external limit on the intensity of control that can be exercised. 
The next step along the continuum is suggested to be specification contracting, the legally
enforceable establishment of specific and detailed conditions of exchange.  With specification
contracts, the intensity of control markedly increases from that related to spot markets (although it is
still moderately low versus other alternatives yet to be discussed).  The parties to a transaction can
exercise coordination control through the ex ante negotiation of contract specifications and the
mutually agreed upon incentives for meeting the specifications.  The parties must invest time and due
diligence beyond mere price discovery and a yes/no decision to transact.  Ex post, the parties exercise
control through proper monitoring of contract execution and related decisions to renew or
renegotiate the contract, or seek third party enforcement if one of the parties fails to perform.  In this
sense, the ex post control process is also more intense than that under spot markets. However, the
success of specifications contracting is still largely dependent upon the ex ante control process.  The
contract specifications and incentives once established become the immutable standards upon which
all ex post control activities depend.   The most extreme ex post control even lies beyond the
transacting parties themselves in that the ultimate enforcement of performance is delegated to a third,
external party represented by the legal system. 
A strategic alliance, the third portion of the continuum, may be defined as an exchange
relationship in which the firms involved share risks and benefits emanating from mutually identified7 1998 AAEA Symposium
objectives.  For an exchange relationship to be a strategic alliance, Martin maintains that it must
exhibit the following three characteristics: mutuality in objective identification, mutuality in
controlling decision making processes, as  well as mutuality in sharing risks and benefits. Following
this definition, coordination in a strategic alliance arises from mutual control.  The analogy of a
marriage is appropriate when discussing strategic alliances.  The partners agree to work closely
together and thus must find some means to resolve internal differences and concerns.  Yet, both
parties retain their separate, external  identity.  Coordination control arises from mutual interests.  
The intensity of control needed to align and maintain mutual interests involves processes that
are more complex than those for either spot markets or specifications contracts.  It is in this sense that
control intensity reaches another, higher level.  The focus of control becomes the relationship between
the parties with the immediate transaction being only one element of the relationship.  Ex ante, the
control process involves building the relationship to help assure that mutual interests are in fact
present.  Arriving at mutual objectives and setting informal parameters for judging the on-going
nature of the relationship and its effectiveness in transacting also become key control activities.  Ex
post, monitoring relationship and transaction performance is essential, and when coordination results
are less than expected, mutual resolution of concerns or a mutual decision to dissolve the relationship
must occur.  In the ex post control activities, the informality of the ex ante activities implies that no
third party judge can be of much assistance and only internal resources of the parties can be brought
to bare on coordination error resolution.  If successful coordination is to be achieved, parties in a
strategic alliance must invest significant time and commitment to both the ex ante and ex post control
processes.  In the final analysis, it is the relationship that determines control and not any specific
transaction per se.8 1998 AAEA Symposium
With strategic alliances, the continuum crosses a significant dividing line between coordination
strategies that rely primarily on ex ante control (spot markets and contracts) and strategies that rely
primarily on ex post control (formal cooperation and vertical integration).  Before discussing these
other strategies, an observation is in order.  Many strategic alliances do have some form of contract
as part of the alliance.  For example, the Michigan Livestock Exchange (MLE) has an exclusive
supplier contract as part of its alliance with a meat processor, Thorn Apply Valley.  But this contract
is only one part of the alliance’s foundation.  The two organizations hope to develop joint marketing
strategies that will improve the ability of both organizations to prosper in the changing meat industry. 
If the alliances were merely limited to the nature of a legal supplier contract, neither firm would
achieve the broader working relationship that each wants for long-term viability.  Therefore, the
existence of a contract in an exchange relationship does not necessarily mean that the relationship lies
on the specification contract portion of the continuum.  The real question is what is the primary
strategy for coordination.  In the MLE-Thorn Apple Valley example, the operative strategy is not the
legal agreement itself, but rather mutual control with a fallback reliance on a contract as a minimum
standard for the exchange relationship.
The fourth position along the continuum, formal cooperation, has been the one least explicitly
defined by prior authors.  It is designed to include a seemingly odd mixture of organizational forms
that include joint ventures, partial ownership relationships, clans, and other organizational forms that
involve some level of equity commitment (money, sweat, or emotional) between the actors in an
exchange relationship.  The distinguishing feature between this portion of the continuum and strategic
alliances is the presence of a formal organization that has an identity distinct from the exchange actors
and that is designed to be their joint agent in the conduct of a coordination transaction.  For the first
time along the continuum, there is a formal organizational structure that is the center of control. 9 1998 AAEA Symposium
Policies and procedures can be formally put in place for the conduct of exchange between the parties. 
An equity commitment makes the defining of decision rights and responsibilities more clear cut than
in the case of a strategic alliance.  Agricultural cooperatives clearly lie at this point on the continuum
as do joint ventures and the keiretsus of Japan.  The key to understanding this coordination strategy is
that, although control can now be accomplished orgnaizationally, the control is decentralized among
the ownership parties and the ownership parties still maintain a separate identity that allows them to
walk away from the exchange if they so desire.  The ability to walk away, however, has been
dramatically reduced by the presence of substantial investment in the new independent identity.  It is
the establishment and maintenance of this independent organization that ratchets up the intensity of
control yet another notch.
The focus of control with formal cooperation is a function of defining the property rights of
stakeholders in the independent entity created by the parties.  Ex ante, the control process consists of
negotiating the formation of the formal decentralized orgnaization that will govern the ex post
resolution of any coordination concerns.  Control of the transaction is delegated to the new, limited
organization with the ability of the ownership parties to monitor results and adjust policies and
procedures ex post.   In this strategy, the real control power is exercised through the ex post
processes and not the ex ante ones.
The final portion of the continuum is vertical integration, i.e., the creation of one organization
that has control over the coordination transaction.  Extending the reasoning from the prior portions of
the continuum, vertical integration results in the two parties to a transaction becoming one party and
thus true or complete hierarchy is achieved.  This can result from merger of the two parties,
acquistion of one party by the other, or one party internally committing resources to replace the
market function of the other party.  In any event, coordination control is exercised within the policies10 1998 AAEA Symposium
and procedures of a single organization.  For the first time in the discussion of continuum strategies,
control can be conceived of as centralized.  There are no separate parties to the transaction that retain
independent decision rights.   As with formal cooperation, the focus of control is defining the
property rights of key stakeholders, but now the rights are in one surviving entity rather that in a
limited separate entity.  The intensity of ex ante and ex post control processes are thus increased even
further in that the scope of control decisions and the difficulty of re-separating the parties makes the
control tasks even more complex.  Ex ante, the control process involves negotiating the formal
centralized ex post governance structure.  Ex post, control results from effective execution of
governance policies and procedures for the centralized organization.
Note that the above definition of vertical integration relies on one centralized control
organization rather than on the more traditional notion of single ownership.  This is a subtle but
critical change in definition.  For example, although a corporation operating at multiple levels in a
production/marketing chain may have single ownership, it need not constitute a case of vertical
integration if the business units of that corporation are allowed to operate autonomously, i.e., in
decentralized fashion.  Such a corporation operates as a form of formal cooperation and not vertical
integration.  Vertical integration in this version of the continuum is a strategy that relies upon
centralized control to achieve coordination.  This is what economists have most often meant by true
hierarchy--an order and command system within a single organization.  The difficulty of the observed
evolution of firms is that single ownership no longer assures singularity of organization as the above
example of a decentralized firm suggests.  Vertical integration requires a centralized decision making
structure that tightly controls the operations of its diverse business units.  Just as single ownership
may not result in vertical integration, multiple ownership does not rule out vertical integration by this
definition.  For example, does a Tyson Foods operate on the specification contract portion of the11 1998 AAEA Symposium
continuum, or does it exercise sufficient centralized control that it operates a truly vertically
integrated system with producers maintaining separate ownership identity in name only?  The latter is
probably closer the truth, and thus a Tyson can be said to be vertically integrated even in the absence
of single ownership.
The above discussion has attempted to establish that the proposed continuum is a continuum
in much more than name only.  The coordination strategies move from low levels of coordination
control intensity  (spot markets) to high levels (vertical integration) while passing through several
transitional levels of ever increasing intensity (specifications contracts, strategic alliances, and formal
cooperation).  The nature of control also transitions from being predominately exercised ex ante to
predominately ex post.  Although singularity of ownership is correlated with this transformation, it is
not (as historically argued) synonymous with it.  Table 1 provides a summary look at how control
intensity changes across the continuum.12 1998 AAEA Symposium
Table 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTROL INTENSITY ACROSS THE VERTICAL COORDINATION CONTINUUM
Spot market Specification Strategic Alliance Formal Vertical Integration
Contract Cooperation
Intensity of Low Moderately Low Moderate Moderately High High
Control
(ex ante dominate) (ex ante dominate) (mixed ex ante/ex (ex post dominate) (ex post dominate)
post)
Focus of Immediate Contract terms Relationship Property rights of Property rights of
Control transaction stakeholders in stakeholders in full
limited joint entity entity
Ex Ante •price discovery •setting specifications •building relationship •negotiating the •negotiating the
Control •yes/no decision to •setting incentives •setting informal formal decentralized formal centralized
Process  transact  parameters  ex post governance  ex post governance
 structure  structure
Ex Post yes/no decision to decision to renew/ mutual resolution or execution of execution of
Control repeat transaction renegotiate contract, dissolution governance policies governance policies
Process or seek third party and procedures in the and procedures in the
enforcement limited entity full entity13 1998 AAEA Symposium
The Coordination Strategy Decision
Having defined the nature of the coordination continuum, the next logical question is where
should a particular firm locate itself along the continuum.  Potentially, a firm must make this strategic
decision for every vertical (forward and backward) exchange relationship that it must execute in the
process of doing business.  Finding effective and efficient means to make these decisions would seem
of obvious importance.
Within the agricultural economics literature, Barkema (1994), Martin et al., and Boehlje and
Schrader have all made initial attempts to define criteria that help a firm decide between open markets
and generic managed coordination, but these attempts were only partially designed to address the
finer decisions between the various forms of managed coordination.  From the management strategy
literature, Mahoney has provided an extensive theoretical derivation of eight coordination strategies
based on three conditions that he argues are sufficient to specify coordination mechanisms.   He
draws upon agency, organizational economics, property rights, and dynamic resource-based theory to
justify his three conditions.  These conditions are asset specificity, task nonseparability, and task
programmability.  His eight strategies readily align themselves across the continuum defined in the last
section.  
However, the sufficiency of Mahoney’s conditions are open to question.  Martin et al. present
a related scheme of strategies created by using risk, trust, and competence as the criteria.  A number
of effective arguments can be offered for the relevance of these criteria.  However, Mahoney argued
that risk does not translate into a determinant set of strategy recommendations, and it might be
argued that competence and trust are sub-elements of programmability and nonseparability.  Even so,
Martin et al. still provides grounds for speculating about the sufficiency of Mahoney’s conditions. 14 1998 AAEA Symposium
Given the evolving nature of vertical coordination strategies, the authors of this paper have
reason to advance an alternative framework that may serve useful to decision making along the
continuum.  This framework arises from focusing more specifically on the analysis that the manager
of a firm might make as part of any decision about vertical coordination strategy.   Figure 2 presents
the proposed framework.
Intuitively, how would operating managers approach the coordination strategy decision if they
understood the varying level of control intensities suggested by the continuum?  The framework of
Figure 2 suggests that such managers would ask themselves five interrelated questions.  First is a
process initiation question: Is the cost of the current coordination strategy too high?  All but newly
established firms are already engaged in vertical transactions, and all thus have current coordination
strategies whether intended or not.  The process of selecting a coordination strategy is then for most
firms a process of considering alternatives to what is already being done rather than starting with a
blank slate.  
A current strategy may be too costly for one of two reasons.  First, it allows costly
coordination errors to occur.  For example, it regularly exposes the firm to the opportunism of trading
partners or it results in chronic over or under production versus demand.  Second, the method of
coordination control creates more operating cost than the coordination errors it is designed to
control.  Having constructed a continuum over which the intensity of control escalates, it is easy to
reason that the cost of control escalates along with intensity.  Therefore, a strategy may become too
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Figure 2: DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGING VERTICAL
COORDINATION STRATEGIES16 1998 AAEA Symposium
 vertical integration of input components may be critical to avoiding coordination errors early in the
life cycle of a product when suppliers of quality inputs may be unavailable.  As a product matures
however, input suppliers become knowledgeable and skillful at providing needed inputs under a
contracting arrange that makes the investment and internal control processes of vertical integration
too costly to sustain for input supply.  If the cost of a current strategy is deemed to be too high for
either of the above reasons, managers would be expected to initiate a process of strategy change.
Once the decision process is thus initiated, the second critical question is: Would an
alternative strategy reduce the costliness of coordination?  The answer to this question depends upon
whether or not another strategy would better match the intensity (and cost) of coordination control
with the costliness of coordination errors.  The match is judged better or worse under the logical
principle that the more costly the errors the more intense the control needed and conversely the less
costly the errors the less intense the control.  Given the manner in which the coordination continuum
was defined, the intensity (and by implication cost) of control has already been mapped into the
various strategies.  What remains is to explain how to assess the cost of a coordination error in a
particular transactions setting.  Drawing upon Williamson, Mahoney, and Milgrom and Roberts, two
criteria can be used to assess the costliness of a coordination error for a given transaction: (1) asset
specificity, and (2) complementarity.
Asset specificity is the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value.  Unlike general purpose assets (e.g., general
purpose machinery and capital) which can be freely transferred across applications, transaction
specific assets are tailored to a particular user (transaction) and thus are valuable only in a narrow
range of alternative uses.  As asset specificity rises, coordination errors would become more costly
since the underlying asset value would be affected adversely by such errors.17 1998 AAEA Symposium
Complementarity exists when the combining of individual activities across a transaction
interface yields an output larger than the sum of outputs generated by individual activities.  Alchain
and Demsetz refer to this as nonseparability and use the example of two men lifting heavy cargo onto
a truck.  If the cargo is of sufficient weight that both men are needed to do the lifting, then the output
of the two working together is far superior to the output of the sum of the two men working alone
(zero!).  The problem with complementarity is not just one of needing multiple rather than single
inputs.  It is also the notion that the marginal product of each input can not be measured and thus it is
nearly impossible to pay each input its appropriate reward without close monitoring (i.e., higher
intensity of coordination control).  The relevant point to this discussion is that as complementarity
between transacting parties rises the costliness of coordination errors will rise because errors will
result in losing the gains from the complementarity.  A good example of how complementarity has
changed in the food system arises from consumer desire to have foods with less pesticide residue. 
Food manufacturers and retailers can not assure the residue level in foods they sell unless they
coordinate through the market chain in such a way that farmers are not applying pesticides
inappropriately.  By their actions alone, manufacturers and retailers can not assure what the end
consumer wants.  Only through controlled coordination with the farmer can the marketing chain
produce the desired end product.
The costliness of a coordination error thus rises with both the level of asset specificity and the
level of complementarity.  Managers need to assess both of these variables relative to specific
transactions and then select a coordination strategy that matches the intensity of control with the
costliness of coordination error.  Much work remains to operationalize this concept of matching
strategy and coordination error cost, but such work is crucial to helping managers make reasoned
decisions about coordination strategy.18 1998 AAEA Symposium
If another coordination strategy offers a potentially better match between closeliness of
coordination errors and coordination control intensity, then a third question becomes relevant to the
strategy change process: Is the potential alternative programmable?  Mere existence of a potentially
better strategy for controlling coordination errors is not enough for adoption.  The decision maker
must now ascertain if effective, specific management routines exist for making the potential strategy
workable.  For example, take a potato producer who has always used spot market transactions but
has now lost a major customer to another producer who was willing to enter into a specifications
contract desired by the customer.  Unless this producer has a rather specific idea of how to create and
evaluate the merit of a specifications contract, he is not in a good position to adopt such an
alternative strategy.  This characteristic of coordination strategies having effective, specific
management routines will be referred to as programmability.
Milgrom and Roberts concept of design attributes in coordination helps add support for both
the question on costliness of coordination errors and this question on programmability.  They argue
that managed coordination (high intensity of control) is appropriate when design attributes are present
in the transaction.  Design attributes are present when  (1) errors of of fit in coordination  are costly
(this is relevant to the first two questions in the framework) and (2) a priori information exits about
the optimal form of the coordination solution.  This second attribute is effectively the programmability
issue.  In making the programmability determination, decision makers must go beyond their own
experience (which is likely to be based on bounded rationality) to search for effective specific
coordination strategies used by others in like settings.  If a programmable alternative can be found,
then the decision maker can proceed to the next step in the change process.
The fourth relevant question becomes: Is the potential alternative implementable? 
Programmability only assures that specific management routines exist.  It does not assure that a19 1998 AAEA Symposium
specific decision maker can effectively implement the routines.  Implementability can be conceived as
arising from four conditions:
1. Capital Availability    Does the decision maker have the capital required to
implement the strategy?  Implementing vertical integration is the easiest of the
strategies to associate with significant outlays of capital for implementation.  But each
alternative strategy has capital implications.  For example, delivering on a
specificiations contract can require substantial investment in assets to produce the
specifications.
2. Existence of Compatible Partners     Does the decision maker have a transacting
partner who will meet the needs of the strategy being implemented?  With control
based on mutual interests, strategic alliances have the most obvious need for a
compatible partner.  A decision maker considering such a strategy should consider
such things as strategic and corporate culture compatibility.  Compatibility will help
assure mutual interests.  However, compatible is relevant to all other strategies as well. 
Even in spot markets, a compatible partner can be defined based on such
characteristics as comparable market power that helps limit opportunism.
3. Control Competence     Given that each coordination strategy has a different intensity
of control, decision makers must examine their competence in exercising the type of
control required by the strategy to be implemented.  Willingness as well as skill are key
to competence.  Many agricultural produces are comfortable with spot market
arrangements in no small measure because they view themselves as having the “horse
trading” skills relevant to spot transactions.  Few have much experience or willingness
to engage in the levels of control needed for vertical integration.
4. Institutional Acceptability     The most obvious test of institutional acceptability is
whether or not a particular strategy is legal, e.g., not in violation of antitrust laws. 
However, institutional acceptability is a broader concept that defines what economic
behaviors or strategies are deemed appropriate by given social, cultural, industrial, or
group norms.  Limits to firm alternatives will be defined by such norms.
Whether or not a particular alternative strategy is deemed implementable will depend on the decision
makers overall assessment of the above four conditions.  Any one condition may create enough
concern that a “no” decision about change will result.
Assuming that an alternative is deemed implementable, the fifth and final question in the
change process becomes relevant: Does the alternative provide a risk/return tradeoff acceptable to the20 1998 AAEA Symposium
decision maker?  The prior steps of assessing an alternative’s costliness of coordination, its
programmability, and its implementability will have provided much data to the decision maker about
the likely benefits of the alternative and its likely costs and risks.  With this fifth question, the explicit
task of balancing these potential returns and risks is added to the framework.  Obviously, the decision
makers risk preferences will be a critical input to answering this question.  But it seems fair to predict
that any alternative strategy must meet the test of providing a better risk/return tradeoff than the
current strategy if change is to occur.
The framework of Figure 2 proposes that only a “yes” answer to all five of the relevant
strategic questions will result in a changed coordination strategy.  A “no” at any point stops the
process from starting or continuing.  A feedback loop is also presented in the framework to make it
clear that the process of coordination strategy evaluation is a dynamic one.  As transaction conditions,
resource availability, and strategy potentials change, the chance to create less costly coordination also
changes.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to report on empirical results, the authors have
made a first attempt to operationalize this framework using a set of 25 producer case studies.  The
model performed remarkably well.  It predicted the willingness of producers to change coordination
strategy in 25 of the 25 cases.  More testing and a better operationalization of the framework are
needed to substantiate these initial results, but the results are promising.
Conclusions and Issues
This paper has attempted to add to the evolving discussion about vertical coordination
strategies.  It has examined several interrelated topics.  First, a vertical coordination continuum can be
defined that moves from low intensity of coordination control (spot markets) to high intensity21 1998 AAEA Symposium
(vertical integration) with three transitional stages of increasing control intensity in between
(specifications contracts, strategic alliances, and formal cooperation).  The nature of control also
changes from being predominately exercised ex ante to the transaction to predominately ex post. 
Ownership was shown to be correlated with this continuum, but not synonymous with it, i.e., single
ownership is not necessary for vertical integration, but centralized control is.  
Second, a decision making framework was presented to model the process that a manager
could use in making decisions about changing from one coordination strategy to another.  The
framework was composed of five key questions:
1. Is the current coordination strategy too costly?  Cost is defined here to include both
the costliness coordination errors allowed by the strategy and the costliness of
operating the strategy itself.
2. Would an alternative strategy reduce the costliness of coordination?  The primary
assessment in response to this question is to match the coordination control intensity
and costliness of alternative coordination strategies with the costliness of coordination
errors inherent in the transaction.  The key transaction characteristics to be measured
are the level of asset specificity and the level of complementarity across the transaction
interface.  The higher the combined levels of asset specificity and complementary the
more costly are coordination errors.
3. Is an alternative programmable?  The key assessment here is whether or not effective,
specific management routines exist to make an alternative workable in the specific
setting of the decision maker.
4. Is an alternative implementable?  Four conditions are necessary to assure
implementability: capital availability, existence of compatible partners, control
competence, and institutional acceptability.
5. Is the risk/return tradeoff acceptable?  A decision maker must finally assess whether or
not a change in coordination strategy will improve the risk/return tradeoff faced by the
firm.  The tradeoff depends upon the decision maker’s risk preferences and the
expectations for risk and return from changing the coordination strategy.22 1998 AAEA Symposium
The framework explicitly proposes that all five questions must be answered “yes” by the decision
maker if a strategy change is to occur.  A “no” at any point stops the process from being initiated or
continued.
Having defined the coordination continuum more completely and developed a decision-
making framework in this paper, the future research tasks need to focus on making the framework
fully operational.  One of the most significant issues involved in this process is the further
conceptualizations needed to measure the key variables of the model.  Measurement methods must be
created for asset specificity, complementarity, programmability, implementability, and the relevant
risk/return tradeoff.  This will be a substantial effort in its own right.
The framework does suggest a number of interesting hypotheses for future empirical research:
1. Is the decision process of managers a consecutive one as currently proposed or do
these questions get considered concurrently such that very favorable responses to
some of the questions might offset doubts and concerns about other questions?  The
predictive ability of the model hinges heavily on this issue.
2. Given that idiosyncratic resources and preferences enter into the decision process, it
would be hypothesized from this framework that different strategies would be pursued
by different firms in the same market.  Empirically, this would be a relatively easy
hypothesis to verify.  What is perhaps even more interesting is whether or not long-
term strategy success arises only from pursuing the most appropriate coordination
strategy given the costliness of coordination errors.  In other words, the total
framework may help explain observed firm behavior but Question 2 on matching
strategy control intensity to costliness of coordination errors may be the only relevant
question for long-term strategic success.  Only those firms who can make the
theoretically optimal strategy programmable, implementable, and risk/return
acceptable will survive.
3. Yet another intriguing hypothesis is whether or not the framework can be used in a
reverse fashion.  Can a decision maker based on preferences decide on a certain
strategy and then move backward through the framework to set resource levels,
management routines, asset specificity levels, and complementary levels that fit the
chosen strategy.
4. Another hypothesis could be formed concerning the stability of the “middle” strategies
across time.  For example, the purely relational foundation of strategic alliances may
make them little more than a transitional strategy.23 1998 AAEA Symposium
5. Finally, what are the relevant policy hypotheses that arise from the framework?  
Are current anti-trust laws antiquated in this environment?  Should all the options
along the continuum be legally available?  Will forces in agri-food markets cause
convergence on one or a very narrow set of strategies along the continuum and thus
make the food economy vulnerable to unforeseen risks or costs?
Vertical coordination strategy seemed a simple thing for most of the history of agriculture. 
After all, agriculture produced commodities that seemed best traded in open markets or transformed
through vertically integrated processors.  Cooperatives were also present as a third way.  But, the
events overtaking the hog industry and other agri-food markets have shown that agriculture is
susceptible to rapid change, and the possibility of effective operations at any point along the vertical
coordination continuum are real.  Further work is needed to convert these possibilities into doable
strategy for specific firms. 24 1998 AAEA Symposium
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